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BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 This is a trade dress infringement action brought under 
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1215(a) (Supp. 
1994).  Plaintiff Duraco Products, Inc. ("Duraco") appeals from 
an order of the district court denying its motion for a 
preliminary injunction against defendants Joy Plastic 
Enterprises, Ltd. ("Joy"), d/b/a Backyard Products, and Travis 
Products, Inc. ("Travis").  Duraco, a manufacturer of plastic 
planters for use in gardens, claims that Joy has infringed the 
trade dress of Duraco's most popular product by marketing a 
planter with a similar shape and texture, and that Travis is 
liable for manufacturing the molds for Joy's planter.  Because 
Duraco's claim is predicated upon infringement of the trade dress 
of the product itself, the appeal requires us to confront a 
difficult area of trade dress law -- that dealing with the 
circumstances under which product configurations, in contrast to 
 
 
product packaging, can, in Lanham Act parlance, constitute 
inherently distinctive trade dress thus serving as a designator 
of origin that will protect the plaintiff's product design 
features against copying. 
 We conclude that traditional trade dress doctrine does 
not "fit" a product configuration case because unlike product 
packaging, a product configuration differs fundamentally from a 
product's trademark, insofar as it is not a symbol according to 
which one can relate the signifier (the trademark, or perhaps the 
packaging) to the signified (the product).  In other words, the 
very basis for the trademark taxonomy -- the descriptive 
relationship between the mark and the product, along with the 
degree to which the mark describes the product -- is unsuited for 
application to the product itself. 
 However, we also think that there is a proper set of 
circumstances for treating a product configuration as inherently 
distinctive.  These circumstances are characterized by a high 
probability that a product configuration serves a virtually 
exclusively identifying function for consumers -- where the 
concerns over "theft" of an identifying feature or combination or 
arrangement of features and the cost to an enterprise of gaining 
and proving secondary meaning outweigh concerns over inhibiting 
competition, and where consumers are especially likely to 
perceive a connection between the product's configuration and its 
source.  We conclude that, to be inherently distinctive, a 
product feature or a combination or arrangement of features, i.e, 
a product configuration, for which Lanham Act protection is 
 
 
sought must be (i) unusual and memorable; (ii) conceptually 
separable from the product; and (iii) likely to serve primarily 
as a designator of origin of the product. 
 The district court applied a different standard, and in 
the ordinary course we might remand for reconsideration under the 
proper test.  However, our examination of the record persuades us 
that, under the standard we adopt, no factfinder could reasonably 
conclude that Duraco has demonstrated a likelihood of success on 
the merits by meeting the threshold distinctiveness requirement 
of section 43(a) either through a showing of inherent 
distinctiveness or, failing that, by establishing secondary 
meaning.  We will therefore affirm the district court's order.  
However, the district court will have to conduct a final hearing 
at which it will apply the newly announced standard.  In view of 
our disposition, we need not reach the other grounds that the 
district court gave for its denial of a preliminary injunction, 
i.e., non-functionality of the trade dress and failure to show a 




I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 A. The Relevant Facts 
 Duraco's most profitable products, its "Grecian Classics" 
plastic planters, account for one tenth of its nearly $35 million 
in annual sales.  These planters, shaped like a Grecian urn, are 
made in two sizes, with diameters of twelve and eighteen inches 
and heights of ten and fifteen inches, respectively.  Their 
plastic construction makes them inexpensive and durable.  But the 
key to their considerable success, according to Duraco, is that a 
careful combination of ornamental features creates in them the 
illusion of marble, cement, or stone construction. 
 The stimulus for the Duraco urn's design was a suggestion 
by Robert Armstrong, a Senior Buyer at K-Mart, Duraco's largest 
retailer customer.  Armstrong had run across urn-shaped planters 
similar in appearance to the eventual design of the Grecian 
Classics at a trade show in the Federal Republic of Germany 
sometime in 1984.  Realizing that like products were not then 
available in the United States, Armstrong met with Duraco 
officials to describe his fortuitous discovery and to encourage 
Duraco to manufacture such an item.  Duraco, in turn, set about 
to satisfy Armstrong's interest.  It surveyed Grecian urns at 
statuary stores and explored its own archives.  As it happened, 
in the late 1970s Duraco had tried to market the "Cotswold 
Planter," an English-made Grecian plastic planter.  Poor sales, 
perhaps attributable to its relatively high retail price tag -- 
$14.99 compared to under $5.00 for the Grecian Classics -- caused 
Duraco to drop the product two years later.  The Cotswold may 
 
 
have survived in United States commerce for some time thereafter, 
but was no longer available at the time of the Armstrong-Duraco 
conference. 
 The Grecian Classics are much like, but not clones of, 
the Cotswold.  Both planters have an hourglass-like design and 
fluting, though the Cotswold has a higher base (hence a higher 
center of gravity), softer lines, and a less realistic texture.  
Despite the differences, Armstrong would have been pleased with a 
replica of the Cotswold urn. 
 Once Duraco showed Armstrong its prototype, K-Mart 
committed itself to purchase 100,000 Grecian Classics planters 
from Duraco.  With no competing plastic urn in the United States 
sporting a similar, detailed design, sales of the eighteen-inch 
Grecian Classics planter reached 460,000 the first year, making 
it Duraco's leading seller.  This overwhelming success persuaded 
Duraco to manufacture a twelve-inch cousin; sales continued to 
soar. 
 Today, Duraco markets the bulk of its planter wares 
directly to large retailers, primarily large discount department 
stores; some distributors are directly supplied.  Advertising is 
typically done cooperatively with the retailers:  the parties 
share costs, and Duraco allows the retailer to use two percent of 
sales receipts for advertising, redeemable in cash or credit.  
The media generally relied upon for consumer advertising are 
Sunday newspaper fliers, magazines, circulars, and newspaper ads.  
In those types of advertising, the planters are generally 
depicted in juxtaposition with other outdoor garden products, 
 
 
such as plant food and watering cans.  Duraco also solicits 
retailers with brochures and trade advertisements. 
 In its marketing endeavors, Duraco encourages, but does 
not contractually require, its retailer customers to place either 
the Duraco tradename or its registered trademark "Garden Scene" 
logo in their advertisements.  Although a retailer's failure to 
display Duraco's logo results, at worst, in an admonition, half 
of the planter advertisements contain the logo.  Nevertheless, 
brand-name awareness in the outdoor garden products area is 
slight -- less than 0.5 percent of consumers in Duraco's survey 
recognized the Duraco name.  This is probably so because planters 
are inexpensive and are typically bought as an impulse item. 
 A number of enterprises compete with Duraco in the 
plastic planter market, amongst them the defendant Joy.  Joy, 
also known by its "Backyard Products" logo, calls its planters 
"Ultimate Urns."  Defendant Travis manufactures the molds for the 
plastic planters; Joy markets them.  The interest of Joy's 
President Thomas Gay in producing a planter configured like a 
classic Grecian urn had been piqued by a color brochure depicting 
the Cotswold urn.  In 1987 and 1988, he approached buyers at K-
Mart and another retailing chain, both of which already stocked 
Duraco's Grecian Classics, to elicit information regarding the 
potential for a competitor to Duraco in the plastic urn market.  
Having received favorable feedback, Gay undertook the development 
of the Backyard Products urn. 
 During the development phase Gay had access to various 
urns in the market, including the Grecian Classics.  His 
 
 
considered observation and analysis of all those urns' features 
convinced him to design one with a deeper bowl -- to hold more 
soil and water for enhanced root development -- and with a lower 
center of gravity -- because some other urns, such as the Duraco 
urns, were too top-heavy and subject to tipping over.  After 
completing his design, Gay engaged defendant Travis to create the 
plastic injection mold for the Ultimate Urns.  Joy's Ultimate 
Urns are strikingly similar in appearance to Duraco's Grecian 
Classics.  Both planters have a similar construction, and both 
are structured in two parts, a top "bowl" section that connects 
at a joint with the "base" or "pedestal" of the planter.  Like 
Duraco, Joy offers a twelve-inch, reduced-scale version of its 
eighteen-inch model. 
 According to Richard Husby, Duraco's Vice President of 
Marketing and Sales, the Ultimate Urns cannot truly compare to 
the Grecian Classics by virtue of Joy's failure to match Duraco's 
punctilious quality control.  Joy's planters, of comparatively 
poor quality according to Husby, can be found in the market with 
drooping flash, poor color, and sharp edges and ridges.  The 
inferior coloring is said to stem from Joy's reliance on a less 
expensive coloring process, and Husby testified that Joy's 
inferior molding technique causes blotching on the urns' bottoms.  
The uneven edges of Joy's planters are caused by Joy's cutting 
away, rather than sanding off, the flashing.1 
                     
   1.   A significant drawback of the injection molding process, 
the technique Duraco uses to manufacture the planters, is that 
strips of plastic, called "flashing," sometimes form on the 
planters' sides as a result of cracks in the molds or excessive 
 
 
 Other differences between the Grecian Classics and 
Ultimate Urns, unrelated to quality, can be noted, though only in 
a sharply focused side-by-side comparison.  The Duraco planter 
has higher fluting (used on the bowl and pedestal of the planters 
to create the illusion of an actual marble or alabaster planter) 
and a wider "landing" on the lip between each flute; the Backyard 
Products urn has a broader base, a lower center of gravity 
(causing it to withstand tipping better), and a twenty percent 
greater fill capacity.  The side of the Backyard Products urn's 
bowl is straight-edged, whereas the Grecian Classics' curves in 
an arc.  Visual coincidence in detail can be noted in the "egg 
and dart" patterns, used primarily for decoration and 
subsidiarily to strengthen the rim, on the lips of the planters' 
bowls. 
 Duraco inadvertently became aware of Joy's competition 
when Duraco's President and Chief Executive Officer John Licht 
stumbled across a Backyard Products planter while shopping in a 
New Jersey retail store.  He saw a defective urn -- one side of 
it was flattened, apparently because it had been removed from the 
mold and laid on its side in a shipping carton while still hot -- 
and purchased it, thinking it to be a defective Duraco urn.  He 
turned the urn over to Duraco's vice president, demanding to know 
how a defective urn could have slipped through Duraco's quality 
(..continued) 
production rates.  Flashing can be sharp, threatening injury to 
someone handling the planter, and unsightly, detracting from the 
aesthetics of the planter.  To combat this irregularity Duraco 
employs quality control workers for the purpose, inter alia, of 
carefully sanding away any flashing from completed planters. 
 
 
control safety net into the marketplace.  When the vice president 
returned with news that the urn was Joy's, not Duraco's, Licht 
phoned Duraco's attorney. 
 Duraco claims that its "trade dress" differs 
significantly from the designs of all other competitors save Joy.  
Duraco does not claim that any of the classical elements in its 
urn's design is protectable; rather, Duraco defines the 
uniqueness of its trade dress according to the total composition 
of all the elements of its urns' configuration, including the 
rim, the finish, the joining of the top and bottom halves, and 
the color results.  Duraco not only adduced evidence that other 
competitors had come up with patently different designs for 
plastic planters, but also presented five designs by its expert 
designer that, according to the expert, could compete effectively 
in the market for "contemporary interpretations of neoclassic 
planters using modifications of classical motifs."  Mem. op. at 
9.  His five designs assertedly achieved the desired motif 
through variations on sundry classical elements, including the 
fluting, rims, radii, pedestals, and egg-and-dart design on the 
bowl's rim.  Thus, in Duraco's submission, Joy could have 
competed effectively without infringing Duraco's trade dress.2 
                     
   2.   Duraco alleges that Joy's competition has negatively 
affected Duraco's pricing power in the retailer market, costing 
it an estimated $600,000 in profits.  K-Mart threatened a switch 
to Ultimate Urns unless the price of Grecian Classics planters 
were lowered; the savings, however, apparently were absorbed by 
the retailer and not passed through to the final consumer.  
Moreover, despite losing some retail accounts to Joy, Duraco's 




 B. The District Court's Disposition 
 The district court's denial of Duraco's motion for a 
preliminary injunction was based on several grounds.  First, it 
concluded that Duraco had failed to show a likelihood of success 
on the merits.  The court disagreed with Duraco that the design 
of the Grecian Classics was distinctive.  According to the court, 
"[a]ny consumer looking at the Duraco, Backyard [Products], and 
Cotswold planters would say that all three are Grecian urn 
planters."  Mem. op. at 8-9.  It continued, remarking that "[t]o 
this observer, all of the urns introduced as exhibits, including 
plaintiff's, defendants' or others', looked about the same, as 
did those presented in drawings by Mr. Hart, the designer."  Id. 
at 10.3 
                     
   3.   The court facetiously crowned its comparison with the 
adapted aphorism, "[a]n urn is an urn is an urn."  Id.  Cf. 
Gertrude Stein, Sacred Emily (1913) ("Rose is a rose is a rose is 
a rose."), in GEOGRAPHY AND PLAYS 178, 187 (1922).  That 
characterization of modern plastic urns is, of course, a far cry 
from the eloquent words of Keats, who, saluting a Grecian urn of 
a far more exquisite nature, and lacking the prescience to 
foresee the commercialization of the classical Grecian form, 
penned these timeless words of adulation: 
 
 Thou still unravish'd bride of quietness, 
   Thou foster-child of silence and slow time, 
 Sylvan historian, who canst thus express 
   A flowery tale more sweetly than our rhyme: 
 What leaf-fring'd legend haunts about thy shape 
   Of deities or mortals, or of both, 
     In Tempe or the dales of Arcady? 
 
John Keats, Ode on a Grecian Urn (excerpt from first stanza). 
 
 
 Applying a taxonomy of trademark distinctiveness 
consisting of generic, descriptive, suggestive, and arbitrary or 
fanciful marks, the court found that the Grecian Classics 
planters were descriptive at best:  "The Duraco urn is clearly 
just that, an urn.  When purchased or inspected, the consumer 
immediately knows the nature of the good before them [sic]:  a 
plastic planter."  Id. at 13.  The court further found that the 
planters' descriptive trade dress had not acquired secondary 
meaning in the market, as 
 [t]here was no evidence that consumers, whether K-Mart 
buyers or retail customers, perceived that the product 
emanates from a single source, or, for that matter, that 
the public identified the Duraco planter with the Duraco 
or Garden Scene name.  The consumer does not appear to be 
moved in any degree to buy the Duraco planter because of 
its source.  Buyers for the K-Mart stores seemed to be 
motivated largely by their profit margin. 
Id. at 15.  Alternatively, the court found the trade dress to be 
"generic." 
 The court also thought the design to be functional, 
"because [all the design elements are] necessary for classically 
styled urns, [and] in combination create the illusion of an 
alabaster chiseled urn."  Id. at 17.  Furthermore, the court 
found that there was no likelihood of consumer confusion, both 
because consumers are disinterested in the identity of the 
manufacturer and because there was no evidence of actual consumer 
confusion (neglecting that of Duraco's president, who is not 
truly a consumer) that Joy's product was Duraco's.4 
                     
   4.   As to the other requirements for a preliminary 
injunction, the court held:  (i) that there was no merit to 




 C. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The district court had original jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C.A. § 1338 (West 1993) (granting district courts original 
jurisdiction over trademark cases).  Appellate jurisdiction is 
invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(a)(1) (West 1993) 
(granting courts of appeals jurisdiction over certain 
interlocutory orders, including denials of preliminary 
injunctions). 
 Duraco appeals the denial of its motion for a preliminary 
injunction in its action under section 43 of the Lanham Act, 15 
U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (Supp. 1994).5  We explained the requisites 
(..continued) 
likelihood of confusion, and the lower quality of Joy's products, 
because Duraco's sales have remained at healthy levels; (ii) that 
the balance of hardships favored Joy, since an injunction would 
destroy its entire business whereas Duraco carried multiple 
product lines, had increased its sales, and had shown no 
likelihood of confusion, loss of consumer good will, or detriment 
to reputation; and (iii) that the public interest favored healthy 
competition over trade dress protection because there had been no 
showing of a likelihood of confusion.  Because we resolve this 
case on the likelihood of success on the merits prong, we will 
not review these other conclusions. 
   5.   That section now provides: 
 
  Any person who, on or in connection with any goods 
or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce 
any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any 
combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, 
false or misleading description of fact, or false or 
misleading representation of fact, which-- 
   (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause 
mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, 
connection, or association of such person with 
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or 
approval of his or her goods, services, or 
commercial activities by another person, or 
 
 
for the issuance of a preliminary injunction as well as the 
nature of our review in such appeals in Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. 
Roosevelt Building Products Co., 963 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1992): 
  In ruling on a motion for a preliminary injunction, 
the district court must consider:  (1) the likelihood 
that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at [the] 
final hearing; (2) the extent to which the plaintiff is 
being irreparably harmed by the conduct complained of; 
(3) the extent to which the defendant will suffer 
irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction is issued; 
and (4) the public interest.  Opticians Ass'n v. 
Independent Opticians, 920 F.2d 187, 191-92 (3d Cir. 
1990).  The injunction should issue only if the plaintiff 
produces evidence sufficient to convince the district 
court that all four factors favor preliminary relief.  
Id. at 192. 
  The decision whether to enter a preliminary 
injunction is committed to the sound discretion of the 
trial court, and will be reversed "only if the court 
abused its discretion, committed an obvious error in 
applying the law, or made a serious mistake in 
considering the proof."  Loretangeli v. Critelli, 853 
F.2d 186, 193 (3d Cir. 1988).  However, "[a]lthough terms 
of an injunction are normally reviewed for abuse of 
discretion, any determination that is a prerequisite to 
the issuance of an injunction . . . is reviewed according 
to the standard applicable to that particular 
determination."  John F. Harkins Co. v. Waldinger Corp., 
(..continued) 
   (B) in commercial advertising or promotion, 
misrepresents the nature, characteristics, 
qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or 
another persons's goods, services, or commercial 
activities, 
 shall be liable in a civil action by any person who 
believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by 
such act. 
 
15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1) (Supp. 1994).  With the Trademark Law 
Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935, 
Congress amended § 43(a) to codify existing constructions of that 
section, see S. REP. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1988), 
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5603, so we will draw 




796 F.2d 657, 658 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied[,] 479 
U.S. 1059, 107 S. Ct. 939 (1987). 
Id. at 632-33 (parallel citation omitted) (emphasis, and first 
and final alterations, supplied).  Thus, we exercise plenary 
review over the district court's conclusions of law and its 
application of the law to the facts, see Marco v. Accent 
Publishing Co., 969 F.2d 1547, 1548 (3d Cir. 1992), but review 
its findings of fact for clear error, see Oberti v. Board of 
Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1220 (3d Cir. 1993), which occurs when we 
are "left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been committed," Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 
105 S. Ct. 1504, 1511 (1985). 
 
II.  THE APPLICABLE LAW 
 A. Trade Dress Law in General 
 "Trade dress" originally referred to the packaging or 
displays associated with trademarked goods.  In the leading case 
of Chevron Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 
F.2d 695, 700-02 (5th Cir. 1981), for example, the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant had 
unfairly competed with the plaintiff by utilizing the same design 
and colors as the plaintiff for packaging its lawn and garden 
products, even though the defendant prominently employed a 
different brand name. 
 That principle of trade dress law grounded in design 
protection has since been extended to the design of a product 
itself.  "Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act proscribes not only 
 
 
trademark infringement in its narrow sense, but more generally 
creates a federal cause of action for unfair competition.  In 
particular, § 43(a) provides a cause of action for unprivileged 
imitation, including trade dress infringement [of unregistered 
trade dress]."  American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, 
Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1140 (3d Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).  
That is, while it was once "well-settled that shapes of products 
in the public domain may be freely copied," id. at 1145 (citing 
cases),6 the same no longer holds true, as federal trademark law 
under the Lanham Act may protect "product configurations," see, 
e.g., Merchant & Evans, 963 F.2d at 633-34; cf. Aromatique, Inc. 
v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 868 (8th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) 
(plurality opinion by Morris Sheppard Arnold, J.) (noting that 
trade dress may now be registered on the Principal Register of 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office).  In Merchant & 
Evans, we reaffirmed that trade dress protection extends beyond a 
product's packaging or labeling to include "`the appearance of 
the [product] itself.'"  Merchant & Evans, 963 F.2d at 633 
(quoting American Greetings Corp., 807 F.2d at 1140). 
 The Lanham Act protection of product configurations 
extends to "the total image of a product, including features such 
as size, shape, color or color combinations, texture, graphics, 
                     
   6.   See JAMES L. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS, TRADENAMES AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 47 (2d ed. 1905) ("It is obvious that if a commercial 
article itself could constitute a trademark, there would be 
little use for patent laws.  As Judge Carpenter said, `in the 
very nature of the case . . . the trademark must be something 
other than, and separate from, the merchandise.'") (quoting Davis 
v. Davis, 27 F. 490, 492 (C.C. Mass. 1886)). 
 
 
or even particular sales techniques."  Computer Care v. Service 
Sys. Enters., Inc., 982 F.2d 1063, 1067 (7th Cir. 1992) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); accord International Jensen, Inc. v. 
Metrosound U.S.A., Inc., 4 F.3d 819, 822-23 (9th Cir. 1993); 
Woodsmith Publishing Co. v. Meredith Corp., 904 F.2d 1244, 1247 
(8th Cir. 1990); Stormy Clime Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 
971, 974 (2d Cir. 1987); Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 
1531, 1535 (11th Cir. 1986); John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke 
Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983).  "`Trade dress 
is a complex composite of features' and `[t]he law of unfair 
competition in respect to trade dress requires that all of the 
features be considered together, not separately.'"  American 
Greetings Corp., 807 F.2d at 1141 (quoting SK&F, Co. v. Premo 
Pharmaceutical Labs., 481 F. Supp. 1184, 1187 (D.N.J. 1979), 
aff'd, 625 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1980)).  Thus, for example, a 
product configuration may be distinctive although no particular 
individual element or feature would be considered distinctive in 
isolation. 
 In this case we deal exclusively with trade dress said to 
inhere in the product itself, rather than trade dress alleged in 
a product's packaging.  Because the legal doctrines in these two 
very different situations will substantially diverge in various 
incidents, we will employ the designation "product configuration" 
to refer to trade dress alleged in the product itself, whether in 
a specific feature or in some combination or arrangement of 
features, and to distinguish that type of trade dress from 
"product packaging."  Cf. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 
 
 
112 S. Ct. 2753, 2760 (1992) ("[T]he protection of trademarks and 
trade dress under § 43(a) serves the same statutory purpose of 
preventing deception and unfair competition.  There is no 
persuasive reason to apply different analysis to the two. . . .  
It would be a different matter if there were textual basis in 
§ 43(a) for treating inherently distinctive verbal or symbolic 
trademarks differently from inherently distinctive trade 
dress."). 
 In Merchant & Evans, we held that in order to qualify for 
trade dress protection, the plaintiff must show: 
 (1) that the imitated feature is non-functional, (2) that 
the imitated feature has acquired a "secondary meaning," 
and (3) that consumers are likely to confuse the source 
of the plaintiff's product with that of the defendant's 
product. 
Merchant & Evans, 963 F.2d at 633 (citing American Home Prods. 
Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 834 F.2d 368, 370 (3d Cir. 1987)); 
accord American Greetings Corp., 807 F.2d at 1141; Standard Terry 
Mills, Inc. v. Shen Mfg. Co., 803 F.2d 778, 780 (3d Cir. 1986).  
The intervening decision in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 
112 S. Ct. 2753, 2758 (1992), has, however, overruled one aspect 
of that formulation, eliminating the need for the plaintiff to 
prove secondary meaning in order to receive protection for 
"inherently distinctive" trade dress.  See Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. 
at 2760.  Hence a plaintiff proceeding under section 43(a) must 
now only prove that (i) the trade dress is distinctive, either 
because it is inherently distinctive or because it has acquired 
distinctiveness; (ii) the trade dress is nonfunctional; and (iii) 
 
 
the defendant's use of plaintiff's trade dress is likely to cause 
consumer confusion.  See id. 
 As just stated, the Supreme Court in Two Pesos used 
"distinctive" in a dual sense, meaning either inherently 
distinctive or having acquired distinctiveness through secondary 
meaning.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13 (Tent. 
Draft No. 2, Mar. 23, 1990),7 cited in Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 
2758.  Because the Supreme Court in Two Pesos did not decide the 
question whether trade dress, and in particular trade dress in a 
product configuration, can actually ever be considered inherently 
distinctive -- for purposes of that case, the Court assumed that 
the restaurant decor at issue was so -- we must first embark on a 
journey to delineate when, if ever, product configurations should 
be deemed inherently distinctive. 
 
                     
   7.   Although the American Law Institute adopted the entire 
Restatement of the Law of Unfair Competition in May 1993, the 
final version is not yet available, and hence we will cite herein 
to the second Tentative Draft. 
 
 
 B.The Problems With The Trademark Taxonomy 
 
 
 Duraco argues that the design of its Grecian Classics 
planters is inherently distinctive because it is "suggestive."  
Duraco borrows the term "suggestive" from trademark law, as 
trademarks have long been classified according to whether they 
are generic, descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful.  
See Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2757 (citing Abercrombie & Fitch Co. 
v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976) (Friendly, 
J.)).  In trademark law, marks belonging to the latter three 
categories of the taxonomy -- suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful 
-- are deemed inherently distinctive and are automatically 
entitled to protection.  See id.; Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. 
Vigoro Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 478 (3d Cir. 1994); A.J. 
Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 296-97 (3d Cir. 1986).  
Marks falling within the first category -- generic marks -- are 
never subject to trademark protection, because to tolerate their 
monopolization would preclude competitors from accurately and 
efficiently describing their products and hence unduly hobble 
them in competition.  See Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2757; Kellogg 
Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 116-19, 59 S. Ct. 109, 
112-14 (1938); Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 
186, 16 S. Ct. 1002, 1008 (1896).  The marks falling within the 
remaining category -- descriptive -- acquire distinctiveness only 
if they come to identify and distinguish the producer's goods, 
i.e., if they acquire secondary meaning.  See 15 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 1052(e)-(f), 1127 (Supp. 1994); Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2757.  
To have acquired secondary meaning, "in the minds of the public, 
the primary significance of a product feature or term [must be] 
 
 
to identify the source of the product rather than the product 
itself."  Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 
851 n.11, 102 S. Ct. 2182, 2187 n.11 (1982) (dicta). 
 Thus, Duraco seeks to latch onto the suggestive trademark 
category to avoid having to demonstrate secondary meaning.  Some 
courts have nonchalantly applied the trademark 
generic/descriptive/suggestive/arbitrary/fanciful taxonomy in the 
product configuration context (though none of them has inquired 
whether it makes sense to do so), see, e.g., Braun, Inc. v. 
Dynamics Corp. of America, 975 F.2d 815, 825 n.18 (Fed. Cir. 
1992) (design of a blender); cf. Paddington, 996 F.2d at 583 
(product packaging); Computer Care, 982 F.2d at 1069 (same); 
Ambrit, Inc., 812 F.2d at 1537 (same), and both parties here 
assume that it provides the proper framework for our analysis, 
see Br. of Appellant at 22-32; Br. of Appellee at 22-30; Reply 
Br. of Appellant at 2-12.  But we do not think it helpful or 
proper to transplant the categorical distinctiveness inquiry 
developed for trademarks to product configurations, where the 
alleged trade dress lies in the very product itself.  See Martin 
P. Hoffman, Trade Dress/Product Simulation Overview, C913 ALI-ABA 
219, 222 (1994) ("The [trademark distinctiveness] categories do 
not fit trade dress considerations very well . . .."). 
 The difficulty is that, perhaps unlike product packaging, 
a product configuration differs fundamentally from a product's 
trademark, insofar as it is not a symbol according to which one 
can relate the signifier (the trademark, or perhaps the 
packaging) to the signified (the product).  Being constitutive of 
 
 
the product itself and thus having no such dialectical 
relationship to the product, the product's configuration cannot 
be said to be "suggestive" or "descriptive" of the product, or 
"arbitrary" or "fanciful" in relation to it.  See Jay Dratler, 
Jr., Trademark Protection for Industrial Design, 1988 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 887, 903 ("Unlike verbal marks, industrial designs do not 
describe anything; they `just are.'"); Ralph S. Brown, Design 
Protection:  An Overview, 34 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1337, 1380 (1987) 
(same); Melissa R. Gleiberman, Note, From Fast Food to Fast Cars:  
Overbroad Protection of Product Trade Dress Under Section 43(a) 
of the Lanham Act, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2037, 2042-43 (1993) 
[hereinafter Gleiberman, Note, Overbroad Protection of Product 
Trade Dress] (same); cf. WILLIAM H. BROWNE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
TRADE-MARKS § 130, at 87 (1873) ("A trademark is nothing more nor 
less than one's commercial signature to his goods; and the mark 
and the goods bear the same relation to one another as do the 
positive and the negative forces of electricity to each other; 
and in their opposition they mutually uphold and sustain.").  The 
very basis for the trademark taxonomy -- the descriptive 
relationship between the mark and the product, along with the 
degree to which the mark describes the product -- is unsuited for 
application to the product itself. 
 Moreover, insofar as consumer motivation to purchase a 
product will much more likely be predicated on an appreciation of 
a product's features than on an appreciation of a product's name, 
assuming no secondary meaning attached to either, one cannot 
automatically conclude from a product feature or configuration -- 
 
 
as one can from a product's arbitrary name, for example -- that, 
to a consumer, it functions primarily to denote the product's 
source.  Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 16 cmt. b 
(Tent. Draft No. 2, Mar. 23, 1990) ("[I]t is less common for 
consumers to recognize the design of a product as an indication 
of source.").  As Judge Nies wrote, concurring in In re DC 
Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1050-51 (C.C.P.A. 1982): 
 There are different considerations where one seeks 
protection of a product design itself, and I have found 
no precedent in decisions of this court, or others, which 
recognizes the protectability of any product design as a 
trademark for that product without proof of 
distinctiveness, that is, distinctiveness as an 
indication of origin, not simply that it is a distinctive 
design in the sense of being unusual.  The semantics, in 
referring to a design as "distinctive," impedes clarity 
in analysis.. . .  Descriptive designations are not 
presumed to function as indications of origin immediately 
upon first use, unlike arbitrary word marks or arbitrary 
logo designs, but rather must be used from some period of 
time before acquiring the status of a trademark. 
 Thus, a fanciful or arbitrary mark, having had no 
established meaning prior to its adoption as a trademark and 
serving no apparent purpose other than to identify (signify) the 
source, is legally presumed to achieve customer recognition and 
association immediately upon its adoption and use.  In contrast, 
a product configuration can not generally give rise to a similar 
presumption, as consumers usually appreciate a product's 
configuration for its contribution to the inherent appeal of the 
product, not (in the absence of secondary meaning) its signifying 
function.  If one felt compelled to apply the trademark taxonomy, 
one could at best say that a product configuration is descriptive 
of (because identical with) the product itself.  This case 
 
 
illustrates the point rather clearly:  whether or not the Grecian 
Classics are "suggestive" of a marble construction or anything 
else, we think it quite improbable that a consumer upon seeing 
Joy's plastic planter in a store would reasonably associate its 
specific configuration with a particular source, even if the 
consumer had repeatedly before seen a Duraco plastic planter. 
 Accordingly, for all the aforementioned considerations, 
we conclude that the trademark taxonomy, carefully and precisely 
crafted through a long succession of cases to accommodate the 
particularities of trademarks, does not fit the quite different 
considerations applicable to product configurations.8  See Hanig 
& Co. v. Fisher & Co., No. 92-C-1779, 1994 WL 97758, at *4 (N.D. 
Ill. Mar. 24, 1994); Martin P. Hoffman, Trade Dress/Product 
Simulation Overview, C913 ALI-ABA at 222. 
 Although Two Pesos made extensive reference to the 
discrete trademark categories, that decision does not foreclose 
our refusal to embrace the trademark distinctiveness taxonomy in 
product configuration cases.  In Two Pesos the Supreme Court 
specifically stated that the sole issue before it was whether 
secondary meaning must be proven for an inherently distinctive 
trade dress vel non, see 112 S. Ct. at 2757 & n.6, and hence the 
applicability of the Abercrombie & Fitch classifications to trade 
dress was not at issue, see Paddington, 996 F.2d at 583.  
                     
   8.   We do not suggest that the same taxonomy might not be 
efficacious in the context of product packaging.  
 
 
Moreover, Two Pesos dealt with a restaurant's decor, more akin to 
product packaging than product configuration. 
 Of course, the rationales supporting the trademark 
distinctiveness taxonomy may sometimes be fruitfully applied to 
trade dress when speaking of the product itself.  For example, 
consider the trademark distinctiveness inquiry.  What is 
"generic" in trademark law is a word with so few alternatives 
(perhaps none) for describing the good that to allow someone to 
monopolize the word would debilitate competitors.  A descriptive 
trademark is one that leaves a larger but finite set of 
equivalent alternatives, and therefore still can be protected 
(because there are adequate alternatives for competitors) but 
only if it has acquired secondary meaning (so that it 
demonstrably functions as a source indicium).  Finally, the 
suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful mark is entitled to automatic 
protection, as there exists a vast universe of equivalent 
alternatives (or, in the case of a suggestive mark, at least a 
vast number of passable alternatives) to choose from, and the 
consumer will reasonably immediately identify the mark for what 
it is -- a source indicium and no more. 
 As noted supra at typescript Error! Bookmark not 
defined., a plaintiff alleging trade dress infringement must 
prove that the dress is non-functional.9  In trade dress law, the 
                     
   9.    Although various forms of the inquiry have been 
articulated, the essence of the question is whether 
a particular feature of a product is substantially 
related to its value as a product or service, i.e., 
if the feature is a part of the "function" served, 
or whether the primary value of a particular feature 
 
 
inquiry into functionality resembles the genericness inquiry in 
trademark law; the two doctrines share essentially the same 
underlying rationale, preserving competition.  But cf. Dratler, 
Trademark Protection for Industrial Designs, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 
at 951-52 (arguing that the genericness doctrine and the 
functionality doctrine -- in form substantially narrower than 
this Circuit has adopted, see supra at n.Error! Bookmark not 
defined. -- serve different purposes).  Thus, just as generic 
trademarks may be copied freely, functional trade dress may also 
be copied freely -- because both are important for preserving 
effective competition.  Similarly, just as descriptive 
trademarks, which are neither generic nor inherently distinctive, 
may be protected upon proof of secondary meaning, trade dress 
that is not functional (and thus leaves a satisfactory number of 
competitively viable alternatives, see Merchant & Evans, 963 F.2d 
at 634-35 & n.4) but not inherently distinctive (and thus not a 
presumptive source indicium) may be protected, but only if 
secondary meaning is shown, see supra at typescript Error! 
Bookmark not defined..  Finally, just as inherently distinctive 
trademarks are protected because presumptively they identify the 
(..continued) 
is the identification of the provider.. . .  Several 
courts have noted that the key policy served by 
barring the use of functional features for 
identification is the policy favoring competition, 
and that the "functionality" inquiry must be 
addressed in light of this policy. 
 
United States Golf Ass'n v. St. Andrews Sys., 749 F.2d 1028, 
1033-34 (3d Cir. 1984) (footnote and citations omitted), quoted 
in Merchant & Evans, 963 F.2d at 634. 
 
 
product's source, inherently distinctive trade dress is protected 





 C. Distinctiveness in the Law of Unfair Competition 
 
 
 Having rejected the transplantation of the trademark 
distinctiveness categories to product configurations, the next 
question we must address is whether a product configuration can 
ever be inherently distinctive.  Before the Supreme Court's 
decisions in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 
84 S. Ct. 784 (1964), and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, 
Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 84 S. Ct. 779 (1964), unfair competition law 
was essentially state law.  Sears and Compco created a federal 
unfair competition law.  See Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2763 
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) ("`Section 43(a) . . . 
has been widely interpreted to create, in essence, a federal law 
of unfair competition.'") (quoting The United States Trademark 
Ass'n Trademark Rev. Comm'n Report and Recommendations to USTA 
President and Board of Directors, 77 TRADEMARK RPTR. 375, 426 
(1987)); American Greetings Corp. 807 F.2d at 1140 ("Section 
43(a) . . . creates a federal cause of action for unfair 
competition."); Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 646 (7th 
Cir. 1993) (Cudahy, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Lanham Act 
(comprising the federal law of trademarks and unfair competition) 
essentially federalizes the common law of trademarks and unfair 
competition."); id. at 647; cf. Kohler Co., 12 F.3d at 640 n.10 
(recognizing relationship between Lanham Act and state common law 
of unfair competition but emphasizing that they are not 
identical).  Congress approved that development in the 1988 
amendments to the Lanham Act.  See Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2765 
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Congress codified the 
judicial interpretation of § 43(a), giving its imprimatur to a 
 
 
growing body of case law . . .."); Kohler Co., 12 F.3d at 636 
("[The 1988 Lanham Act amendments] as a codification of prior 
case law . . . validate the uniform preamendment interpretation 
of § 45 [of] the Act."); S. REP. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 
40 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5603.  Thus, it 
will be instructive to commence our inquiry with a survey of the 
common law tort of unfair competition. 
 
 1. State Unfair Competition Law 
 Under state unfair competition law, a product 
configuration could obtain protection from copying only if it 
first had acquired secondary meaning.  See, e.g., Gum, Inc. v. 
Gumakers of America, Inc., 136 F.2d 957, 958 (3d Cir. 1943); 
American Fork & Hoe Co. v. Stampit Corp., 125 F.2d 472, 474 (6th 
Cir. 1942); Lewis v. Vendome Bags, Inc., 108 F.2d 16, 18 (2d Cir. 
1939); Sinko v. Snow-Craggs Corp., 105 F.2d 450, 452 (7th Cir. 
1939); Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 300 
(2d Cir. 1917); Rathbone, Sard & Co. v. Chamption Steel Range 
Co., 189 F. 26, 30-32 (6th Cir. 1911); 1 HARRY D. NIMS, THE LAW OF 
UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS § 134(a), at 370, 378-79 (4th ed. 
1947) [hereinafter NIMS, LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION]; see also Two 
Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2762 (Stevens, J., concurring in the 
judgment); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 
U.S. 141, 158, 109 S. Ct. 971, 981 (1989); 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 7:23, at 227, § 8:2, at 285 (2d ed. 
1984).  The concept of an inherently distinctive product 
configuration was, in other words, alien to the common law. 
 
 
 Secondary meaning in the product configuration context 
was then, as it is now, defined to "attach[] to a given shape or 
form of article when that form is associated in the minds of 
prospective customers with the source from which the article came 
to such an extent that demand for the particular article depends 
upon the business reputation or standing of its maker."  American 
Fork & Hoe, 125 F.2d at 475; see Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. at 118, 
120, 59 S. Ct. at 113-14 (explaining that secondary meaning has 
not been established when the form of the article, in the minds 
of the public, is primarily associated with the article rather 
than a particular producer); supra at typescript 22 (quoting 
Inwood Labs.).  The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
succinctly expounded the persuasive rationale for this doctrine 
in Sinko, which involved the defendant's copying of plaintiff's 
successful knobs for automobile steering wheel spinners: 
 Sinko created a desire on the part of the public for one 
of two things, either for knobs made by Sinko, above all 
other knob makers, or for knobs made in a particular 
manner regardless of who made them.  If it is the first 
situation, the law of unfair competition gives Sinko the 
right to monopolize or to exclude other makers from 
copying the product.  If it is the latter situation, 
Sinko receives no such right to monopolize, even though 
he might have been the first one to make the article in 
the particularly desirable manner. 
Sinko, 105 F.2d at 453; accord 1 NIMS, LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 134, at 373 (citing Diamond Expansion Bolt Co. v. U.S. 
Expansion Bolt Co., 164 N.Y.S. 433 (App. Div. 1917)).  Similarly, 
then-District Judge Learned Hand, sitting by designation, wrote 
for the Second Circuit: 
 The cases of so-called "nonfunctional" unfair competition 
. . . are only instances of the doctrine of "secondary 
 
 
meaning."  All of them presuppose that the appearance of 
the article, like its descriptive title in true cases of 
"secondary" meaning, has become associated in the public 
mind with the first comer as manufacturer or source, and, 
if a second comer imitates the article exactly, that the 
public will believe his goods have come from the first, 
and will buy, in part, at least, because of that 
deception.  Therefore it is apparent that it is an 
absolute condition to any relief whatever that the 
plaintiff in such cases show that the appearance of his 
wares has in fact come to mean that some particular 
person -- the plaintiff may not be individually known -- 
makes them, and that the public cares who does make them, 
and not merely for their appearance and structure.  It 
will not be enough only to show how pleasing they are, 
because all the features of beauty or utility which 
commend them to the public are by hypothesis already in 
the public domain.  The defendant has as much right to 
copy the "nonfunctional" features of the article as any 
others, so long as they have not become associated with 
the plaintiff as manufacturer or source.  The critical 
question of fact at the outset always is whether the 
public is moved in any degree to buy the article because 
of its source and what are the features by which it 
distinguishes that source. 
Crescent Tool Co., 247 F. at 300 (emphasis supplied). 
 Finally, Chief Justice Holmes, then sitting on the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, also explained the 
irreproachable rationale sustaining the prerequisite of secondary 
meaning before affording protection to product configurations: 
 In the absence of a patent the freedom of manufacture 
cannot be cut down under the name of preventing unfair 
competition.  All that can be asked is that precautions 
shall be taken, so far as are consistent with the 
defendant's fundamental right to make and sell what it 
chooses, to prevent . . . deception . . .. 
  It is true that a defendant's freedom of action with 
regard to some subsidiary matter of ornament or label may 
be restrained, although a right of the same nature with 
its freedom to determine the shape of the articles which 
it sells.. . .  [T]he instrument sold is made as it is 
[by defendant], partly at least, because of a supposed or 
established desire of the public for instruments in that 
form.  The defendant has the right to get the benefit of 
that desire even if created by the plaintiff.  The only 
 
 
thing it has not the right to steal is the good will 
attaching to the plaintiff's personality, the benefit of 
the public's desire to have goods made by the 
plaintiff.. . .  [T]he plaintiff's right can be protected 
sufficiently by requiring the defendant's [products] to 
be clearly marked so as to indicate unmistakably that 
they are the defendant's and not the plaintiff's 
goods.. . . To go further is to save the plaintiff from a 
competition from which it has no right to be exempt. 
Flagg Mfg. Co. v. Holway, 59 N.E. 667, 667 (Mass. 1901) 
(citations omitted). 
 Thus, traditional unfair competition law would not 
mandate a copier to take positive steps to avoid confusion unless 
"the existence of secondary meaning . . . plainly appear[ed]."  
American Fork & Hoe, 125 F.2d at 475.  If a product feature had 
obtained secondary meaning, but was functional, all a defendant 
had to do, to avoid competing unfairly, was to "use reasonable 
care to inform the public of the source of its product."  Gum, 
Inc., 136 F.2d at 960 (citing Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. at 120, 59 S. 
Ct. at 114); see Vaughan Novelty Mfg. Co. v. G.G. Greene Mfg. 
Corp., 202 F.2d 172, 176 & n.11 (3d Cir.) (citing RESTATEMENT OF 
TORTS § 741, cmt. j (1938)), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820, 74 S. 
Ct. 34 (1953); American Fork & Hoe, 125 F.2d at 475; Crescent 
Tool Co., 247 F. at 301; 1 NIMS, LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 134, at 
371; cf. J.C. Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 
949, 955-56 (8th Cir. 1941).  This latter doctrine survives 
intact today.  See American Greetings Corp., 807 F.2d at 1141 
("When a feature or combination of features is found to be 
functional, it may be copied and the imitator may not be enjoined 
from using it . . ..  Nevertheless, if the functional feature or 
 
 
combination is also found to have acquired secondary meaning, the 
imitator may be required to take reasonable steps to minimize the 
risk of source confusion.") (citations omitted); id. at 1144-45 & 
n.4.  A defendant could be completely barred from copying a 
product configuration only if the configuration both was 
nonfunctional and had acquired secondary meaning. 
 In short, the common law did not find any "unfairness," 
as concerns the law, in someone's copying a design -- even if it 
was originally produced through great expenditures of labor, 
effort, talent, and capital -- if the design was unprotected by 
patent or copyright.  See, e.g., Zangerle & Peterson Co. v. 
Venice Furniture Novelty Mfg. Co., 133 F.2d 266, 269 (7th Cir. 
1943).  What the courts of equity condemned was not bare-knuckled 
competition, but fraud and deceit, which are worked when one 
"palms off" one's goods as those of another, see, e.g., Zangerle 
& Peterson, 133 F.2d at 269-70; J.C. Penney, 120 F.2d at 953-54; 
Lewis, 108 F.2d at 18; Sinko, 105 F.2d at 452; Rathbone, Sard & 
Co., 189 F. at 30-31; EDWARD S. ROGERS, GOOD WILL, TRADE-MARKS, AND 
UNFAIR TRADING 212 (1914); cf. 1 NIMS, LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 134, 
at 374 ("The fact that the defendant may have deliberately copied 
the appearance of the plaintiff's goods and that in doing so may 
have gained an advantage, is not enough.  The imitating must have 
been done with the expectation of obtaining some unfair 
advantage."); see also Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2762 & n.5 
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. 
at 157, 109 S. Ct. at 981; that is, when one deceives the 
consuming public and misappropriates -- trades upon -- the good 
 
 
will of another.  Exploiting the "goodwill of the article," 
Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. at 121, 59 S. Ct. at 115 -- the attractive 
features, of whatever nature, that the product holds for 
consumers -- is robust competition; only deceiving consumers, or 
exploiting the good will of another producer, is unfair 
competition. 
 
 2. Precedent Under Section 43(a) 
 Besides having no foothold in the common law, recognizing 
the existence of inherently distinctive product configurations is 
arguably inconsistent with precedent in this Circuit.  As we have 
mentioned, in Merchant & Evans we held that a feature of the 
product itself qualifies for trade dress protection only if the 
plaintiff proves that the imitated feature is nonfunctional, that 
it has acquired secondary meaning, and that consumers are likely 
to confuse the source of the plaintiff's products with that of 
the defendant's.  Merchant & Evans, 963 F.2d at 633.  This might 
be read as an implied holding that trade dress in the product 
itself can never be inherently distinctive.  But the panel did 
not advance this proposition in Merchant & Evans, and, especially 
given the Supreme Court's intimations in the intervening Two 
Pesos decision, we do not read Merchant & Evans in that fashion. 
 As already stated, Two Pesos poses a problem with 
adhering to Merchant & Evans insofar as the Supreme Court's 
decision eliminated the secondary meaning prong for inherently 
distinctive trade dress.  Of course, Two Pesos only answered the 
question "whether trade dress which is inherently distinctive is 
 
 
protectable under § 43(a) without a showing that it has acquired 
secondary meaning," 112 S. Ct. at 2757 (emphasis supplied); it 
did not define what makes trade dress inherently distinctive and, 
more importantly for our purposes, did not decide whether a 
product configuration could ever be inherently distinctive, cf. 
Kohler Co., 12 F.3d at 641 n.11 (dicta) ("[A] product's shape is 
never inherently distinctive.").  And Two Pesos, which dealt with 
the decor of a Mexican restaurant, is a product packaging, not a 
product configuration, case.  See 112 S. Ct. at 2755 & n.1.  See 
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 16 cmt. b (Tent. Draft 
No. 2, Mar. 23, 1990) ("Product designs are . . . not considered 
inherently distinctive; such designs are protectable only upon 
proof of secondary meaning."); MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 7.31 n.1 (citing conflicting sources). 
 Nevertheless, we do read Two Pesos as giving an 
imprimatur to finding trade dress in a product configuration to 
be inherently distinctive under certain narrow circumstances.  
Cf. id. at 2759 (not distinguishing among "a verbal or symbolic 
mark or the features of a product design"); id. at 2760 
(discussing protectability of "design[s]" and "shape[s]").  The 
Supreme Court provided two strong competition-based rationales 
why at least some trade dress should be deemed inherently 
distinctive. 
 First, the Court noted that protection of trade dress 
along with trademarks could further the Lanham Act's purpose to 
"`secure to the owner of the mark [or dress] the goodwill of his 
business and to protect the ability of consumers to distinguish 
 
 
among competing producers.'"  Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2760 
(quoting Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 
189, 198, 105 S. Ct. 658, 663 (1985)).  "By making more difficult 
the identification of a producer with its product," the Court 
explained, "a secondary meaning requirement for a non-descriptive 
trade dress would hinder improving or maintaining the producer's 
competitive position."  Id.  We think that such an overly 
rigorous uniform requirement for product configurations would 
have a similar deleterious effect. 
 Second, the Court reasoned that always requiring 
secondary meaning would not protect the developer of a "fanciful" 
or "arbitrary" trade dress from "theft" while the developer tries 
to acquire secondary meaning for its trade dress.  See id. at 
2758-59; cf. Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 
825 (3d Cir. 1981).  In particular, the Court was concerned about 
the "anticompetitive effects [of] particular burdens on the 
start-up of small companies."  Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2761.  
Always requiring secondary meaning would burden fledgling 
companies seeking to expand into new markets because established 
competitors could "appropriate the originator's [inherently 
distinctive nonfunctional trade] dress in other markets and . . . 
deter the originator from expanding into and competing in these 
areas."  Id.  This rationale also would seem to apply whether the 
trade dress is alleged in a product packaging or a product 
configuration. 
 Of course, it is not the purpose of unfair competition 
law, under the guise of either consumer protection or the 
 
 
protection of business good will, to implement a policy of 
encouraging innovative designs by protecting them once 
designed.10  See Gleiberman, Note, Overbroad Protection of 
Product Trade Dress, 45 STAN. L. REV. at 2056-57; cf. Dratler, 
Trademark Protection for Industrial Designs, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 
at 909 ("[F]ostering innovation is only a minor and incidental 
purpose of trademark protection.").  Those issues are the 
province of copyright and patent laws.  Moreover, design 
protection laws (which have repeatedly been introduced in 
Congress during virtually every session since 1917) have not once 
been enacted.  See In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d 1214, 1218-19 & n.1 
(C.C.P.A. 1981) (Rich, J., concurring) (recounting the history of 
efforts to pass design protection legislation); Esquire, Inc. v. 
Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 800 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (observing that 
since 1914 none of the approximately 70 design protection bills 
introduced in Congress had passed); Brown, Design Protection:  An 
Overview, 34 U.C.L.A. L. REV. at 1395 ("Beginning in 1957, a 
[design protection] bill has been introduced in probably every 
Congress . . .."); Dratler, Trademark Protection for Industrial 
Designs, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. at 888 & n.4, 904 & n.94 (stating 
                     
   10.   The two principal purposes of the trademark statute are 
to avoid consumer confusion and to protect a trademark owner, 
which has invested "energy, time, and money in presenting to the 
public the product, . . . from [the trademark's] misappropriation 
by pirates and cheats."  S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 
(1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1274, 1274; see 
S. REP. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1988), reprinted in 
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5605 (1988 amendment); Park 'N Fly, Inc., 
469 U.S. at 198, 105 S. Ct. at 663; Inwood Labs., 456 U.S. at 854 
n.14, 102 S. Ct. at 2188 n.14; see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (Supp. 
1994) (identifying five purposes of the amended Lanham Act). 
 
 
that the history of the effort to have Congress enact industrial 
design legislation takes up 160 pages in a Copyright office 
bibliography, and that between 1914 and 1945 at least 45 such 
bills were introduced in Congress); A. Samuel Oddi, The Functions 
of "Functionality" in Trademark Law, 22 HOUS. L. REV. 925, 951 & 
n.147 (1985); Gleiberman, Note, Overbroad Protection of Product 
Trade Dress, 45 STAN. L. REV. at 2070 & nn. 251-52; cf. Bonito 
Boats, 489 U.S. at 167-68, 109 S. Ct. at 986 ("It is for Congress 
to determine if the present system of design and utility patents 
is ineffectual in promoting the useful arts in the context of 
industrial design."). 
 Under the laws that are on the books, Congress has 
repeatedly chosen not to protect designs unless they meet certain 
strict requirements, catalogued in Merchant & Evans, 963 F.2d at 
638-40; see also Dratler, Trademark Protection for Industrial 
Designs, 1988 U. ILL L. REV. at 923-35; Gleiberman, Note, 
Overbroad Protection of Product Trade Dress, 45 STAN. L. REV. at 
2055-65, and then Congress has only given them protection of 
circumscribed duration, cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 
(authorizing Congress to grant patents of limited duration).  We 
believe that courts should exercise restraint so as not to 
undermine Congress's repeated determinations not to afford 
virtually perpetual protection to product configurations with an 
expansive construction of section 43(a).  What Congress has, for 
the great span of this century, been unwilling to do, see supra 




 Thus Duraco's suggestion, based on its reading of 
Paddington, 996 F.2d at 582-83, that the capacity of the 
product's configuration to distinguish the plaintiff's goods from 
others suffices to establish inherent distinctiveness, is grossly 
overinclusive.  It is also circular:  clearly any perceptible 
product feature or combination or arrangement of features can 
distinguish goods, and perhaps is likely to do so if, as a rule, 
nobody else were allowed to copy it.11  That is, provided that no 
one besides the originator is allowed to use a particular 
feature, it would be difficult to conjure up any perceptible 
feature that users can train upon that is not capable of 
distinguishing the originator's goods from those of others.  For 
                     
   11.   In Paddington, an importer of the anise liqueur ouzo 
under the label "No. 12 Ouzo" brought a trademark and trade dress 
infringement suit against a rival ouzo importer using the label 
"#1 Ouzo."  The importers' bottle designs, labeling, and gift 
boxes were strikingly similar in appearance, containing similar 
design elements and "using identical shades of red, white and 
black."  Id. at 586.  The court of appeals concluded that 
 
 [t]he No. 12 Ouzo bottle is inherently distinctive.. . .  
There is nothing descriptive about the bottle and label 
design that conveys anything about its particular 
contents, except for the use of the trademark "No. 12 
Ouzo," . . . and the fact that the bottle . . . indicates 
to the observer that it contains a liquid that probably 
is potable.  The tone and layout of the colors, the style 
and size of the lettering, and, most important, the 
overall appearance of the bottle's labeling, are 
undeniably arbitrary.  They were selected from an almost 
limitless supply of patterns, colors and designs. 
 
Id. at 584 (emphasis supplied).  Therefore, a secondary meaning 
inquiry was unnecessary, id., and after reversing the district 
court by finding a likelihood of confusion, the court reinstated 




example, even the basic design of a light bulb is "capable of 
identifying a particular source of the product," Paddington, 996 
F.2d at 582-83, assuming that only one manufacturer produces the 
basic design, a fact which would be assured, of course, if the 
design were protected against copying. 
 Duraco's proposal to treat any product feature or 
configuration as inherently distinctive if it were merely capable 
of identifying the source of the product would therefore 
eviscerate the requirement for showing secondary meaning.  Cf. 
Turtle Wax, Inc. v. First Brands Corp., 781 F. Supp. 1314, 1321 
(N.D. Ill. 1991) ("Presumably, it could be said about the trade 
dress of any new product that no competitive product combines 
precisely the same elements in its trade dress.. . .  However, 
that fact alone does not make the product's trade dress 
inherently distinctive.  Any other rule essentially would require 
a finding of inherent distinctiveness whenever a new product 
enters the market.").  This is so even though the design is not 
at all deserving of such protection because, leaving aside the 
question of functionality, a consumer seeing another good 
incorporating the same design feature or features would not 
reasonably believe the first manufacturer to be its source. 
 Moreover, contrary to Duraco's understanding, Paddington 
did not read Two Pesos as establishing the "capable of 
identifying" standard for inherent distinctiveness.  In the Two 
Pesos passages cited in Paddington, the Supreme Court was simply 
establishing that inherently distinctive trade dress need not 
acquire secondary meaning before obtaining protection under the 
 
 
Lanham Act.  Thus, the Supreme Court stated that no secondary 
meaning would be required for "inherently distinctive trade dress 
. . . capable of identifying a producer's product."  112 S. Ct. 
at 2760 (emphasis supplied).  That statement explains what is 
necessary, but not what is sufficient, to make trade dress 
inherently distinctive.  Paddington, alert to this qualification, 
simply held that a feature's capacity to distinguish the goods is 
a prerequisite to trademark protection, not a sufficient 
condition.  See 996 F.2d at 582-83.  Indeed, the Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit in Paddington -- a product packaging case 
-- went further and distinguished between merely descriptive 
trade dress, for which the plaintiff had to prove secondary 
meaning, and suggestive, fanciful, or arbitrary trade dress, for 
which no secondary meaning was required.  See 996 F.2d at 583; 
see also Nancy D. Chapman, Trade Dress Protection in the United 
States After the Supreme Court Decision in Two Pesos, 387 PLI/PAT 
7, 13-16, 40-42 (1994) [hereinafter Chapman, Trade Dress 
Protection] (criticizing the "capable of identifying" standard). 
 In any event, the analysis appropriate for a product's 
packaging, at issue in Paddington, is not necessarily appropriate 
for a product's configuration.  Product packaging designs, like 
trademarks, often share membership in a practically inexhaustible 
set of distinct but approximately equivalent variations, and an 
exclusive right to a particular overall presentation generally 
does not substantially hinder competition in the packaged good, 
the item in which a consumer has a basic interest.  A product 
configuration, contrariwise, commonly has finite competitive 
 
 
variations that, on the whole, are equally acceptable to 
consumers.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 16 cmt. b 
(Tent. Draft No. 2, March 23, 1990) (contrasting product 
configurations and product packagings based on the availability 
of alternatives).  Moreover, because of consumers' common 
abundant experience with similar goods being sold in differing 
packaging, a consumer is substantially more likely to trust a 
product's packaging, rather than its configuration, as an 
indicium of source.  Accordingly, we reject the misreading of 
Paddington advanced by Duraco. 
 It is not ipso facto "unfair competition," we believe, 
for one boldly to copy a competitor's product; it is only "unfair 
competition" to trade off another's good will and in the process 
dupe consumers into mistaking one's products for another's.  A 
proper approach to inherent distinctiveness must distinguish 
between nonfunctional but desirable designs -- which, absent 
secondary meaning, unfair competition law has no interest in 
precluding others from copying -- and nonfunctional designs 
representing to consumers the source of the goods -- which unfair 
competition law does and should forbid others from copying. 
 
 3. The Standard for Inherent Distinctiveness of 
  Trade Dress in Product Configurations 
 Synthesizing the principles explored in the preceding 
sections, we think that there is a proper set of circumstances 
for treating a product configuration as inherently distinctive.  
These circumstances are characterized by a high probability that 
 
 
a product configuration serves a virtually exclusively 
identifying function for consumers -- where the concerns over 
"theft" of an identifying feature or combination or arrangement 
of features and the cost to an enterprise of gaining and proving 
secondary meaning outweigh concerns over inhibiting competition, 
and where consumers are especially likely to perceive a 
connection between the product's configuration and its source.  
In particular, we think that, to be inherently distinctive, a 
product configuration -- comprising a product feature or some 
particular combination or arrangement of product features -- for 
which Lanham Act protection is sought must be (i) unusual and 
memorable; (ii) conceptually separable from the product; and 
(iii) likely to serve primarily as a designator of origin of the 
product. 
 For a product configuration to have the capacity to 
distinguish goods in a consumer's mind -- the first prerequisite 
for inherent distinctiveness -- it must be unusual and memorable.  
It must partake of a unique, individualized appearance, so that a 
consumer informed of all the options available in the market 
could reasonably rely on it to identify a source.  See Computer 
Care, 982 F.2d at 1069; Hoffman, Trade Dress/Product Simulation 
Overview, C913 ALI-ABA at 222 (asserting that trade dress is 
inherently distinctive only if "so unique, . . . in a particular 
market, that one can assume, without proof, that it will 
automatically be perceived by customer[s] as an indicia [sic] of 
origin -- a trademark") (omission in original) (citing MCCARTHY, 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION and Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 805 
 
 
F.2d 974, opinion superseded by 812 F.2d 1531 (11th Cir. 1986)).  
"Manifestly, if the plaintiff's trade dress is not sufficiently 
distinctive to allow consumers to identify the [source] from the 
trade dress, then the dress does not inherently serve as an 
indication of origin . . .."  Ambrit, Inc., 812 F.2d at 1536, 
quoted in Nexxus Prods. Co. v. Bertle Concepts, Inc., 28 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1257, 1266 (M.D. Fla. 1993). 
 Moreover, unless the trade dress is memorable -- that is, 
striking or unusual in appearance, or prominently displayed on 
the product packaging, or otherwise somehow apt to be impressed 
upon the minds of consumers, so that it is likely to be actually 
and distinctly remembered -- it cannot serve as a designator of 
origin.  See Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1468, 
1470 (W.D. Mo. 1994); id. at 1471 ("The trade dress must be 
remembered before it can be confusing."); cf. Ambrit, Inc., 812 
F.2d at 1536 (setting forth criterion to measure 
distinctiveness); Computer Care, 982 F.2d at 1069 (holding that 
sales brochures are inherently distinctive if consumers can 
identify the product from the trade dress and the trade dress is 
arbitrary or suggestive).  Thus, for example, designs customary 
in the industry can not be inherently distinctive (nor for that 
matter can they acquire secondary meaning).  See Paddington, 996 
F.2d at 583-84; Hanig & Co., 1994 WL 97758, at *6-*7; 1 NIMS, LAW 
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 134a, at 379 (citing Rathbone, Sard & Co., 
189 F. 26); cf. Aromatique, 28 F.3d at 869-70 (per curiam) 
(plurality opinion by Morris Sheppard Arnold, J.) (holding that 
 
 
the plaintiff's pillow-shaped cellophane packages were not 
inherently distinctive, because commonplace). 
 But the uniqueness of a product configuration is not 
enough by itself to make the configuration inherently 
distinctive.  To be inherently distinctive, a product 
configuration must also be conceptually separable from the 
product, so that a consumer will recognize its symbolic 
(signifying) character.  This requirement ensures that consumers 
unaware of any association of the product with a manufacturer 
(i.e., where a configuration has no secondary meaning) will not 
become confused about whether a particular configuration may be 
trusted as an indicium of origin.  To be conceptually separable, 
the product configuration must be recognizable by the consumer 
"as an indicium of source, rather than a decorative symbol or 
pattern.. . ."  Stuart Hall, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1471 (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see Hoffman, Trade Dress/Product 
Simulation Overview, C913 ALI-ABA at 223 (contending that trade 
dress is inherently distinctive only if "one can assume, without 
proof, that it will automatically be perceived by customers as an 
indicia [sic] of origin"); cf. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 7.26, at 248 (suggesting that features perceived as 
"merely ornamental" cannot serve as trademarks). 
 As with trademarks, an inherently protectable product 
configuration must, at least conceptually, be "something other 
than, and separate from, the merchandise."  Davis v. Davis, 27 F. 
490, 492 (C.C. Mass. 1886).  That is, the configuration for which 
protection is sought must not appear to the consumer as a mere 
 
 
component, or the essence, of the product gestalt, but rather 
must appear as something attached (in a conceptual sense) to 
function in actuality as a source designator -- it must appear to 
the consumer to act as an independent signifier of origin rather 
than as a component of the good.  See, e.g., In re General Tire & 
Rubber Co., 404 F.2d 1396, 1398-99 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (affirming 
denial of injunction because consumers would probably think of 
product feature as ornamentation rather than as indicium of 
source). 
 Third, to be inherently distinctive, it must be likely 
that the product configuration will primarily serve as a 
designator of the source of the product.  See Chapman, Trade 
Dress Protection, 387 PLI/PAT at 32 ("`Unique' is not by itself 
equivalent to inherently distinct, but a unique design may be so 
if it also functions as a source indicator."); supra at 
typescript Error! Bookmark not defined.-Error! Bookmark not 
defined. (rejecting Duraco's reading of Paddington).  If the 
configuration itself, separate from the product, is likely to 
serve some substantial purpose other than as a designation of 
origin -- that is, besides to set it apart from other sources' 
products in consumers' minds -- then it cannot be inherently 
distinctive, but must acquire secondary meaning before becoming 
entitled to protection against copying.  In this regard, a 
source's intent in adopting the particular configuration is 
highly probative.  See Stuart Hall, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1470 & n.2; 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 719 cmt. a (1938) ("[D]esigns intended solely 
as ornamentations are not trade-marks . . .."); Joan L. Dillon, 
 
 
Two Pesos:  More Interesting for What It Does Not Decide, 83 
TRADEMARK RPTR. 77, 85 (1993) (defining protectable trade dress as 
"a combination of elements selected to identify origin, rather 
than to serve as mere decor"); NIMS, LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, at 370 
("Peculiar and arbitrary features in the form, structure, 
arrangement of parts, and general appearance of an article are 
often devised, in large part to distinguish it -- to give it 
individuality."). 
 The inquiry here does not duplicate that employed for 
secondary meaning; instead of focusing on consumers' actually 
acquired mental associations, the inquiry focuses on whether a 
consumer would likely perceive the feature or combination or 
arrangement of features as something that renders the product 
intrinsically more desirable regardless of the source of the 
product, or primarily as a signifier of the product's source.  
Protecting a product configuration without a showing of secondary 
meaning because the configuration is pleasant rather than because 
it identifies the source of the product would risk seriously 
transgressing the protective zones mapped by the patent laws.12  
                     
   12.   In the design protection area, our construction of the 
Lanham Act is informed to some degree by the concurrent existence 
of the patent laws.  See Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, 
Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1992, 2002 (1994) (invoking the "familiar 
principle of statutory construction that, when possible, courts 
should construe statutes . . . to foster harmony with other 
statutory and constitutional law"); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 16 cmt. b (Tent. Draft No. 2, Mar. 23, 1990) 
("Rigorous application of the requirements of distinctiveness 
. . . is essential in order to avoid undermining the carefully 
circumscribed statutory regimes for the protection of useful and 
ornamental designs under federal patent and copyright law.").  It 
would not be politic to enable easy circumvention of the strict 
 
 
This is not to say that a configuration must be undesirable to be 
eligible as an inherently distinctive product configuration; we 
refer here only to the source-designating function of the 
configuration. 
 Thus, if the feature as to which Lanham Act protection is 
sought is likely to be notably desirable to consumers for some 
reason other than its function as a source designator, it cannot 
be considered inherently distinctive.  Like a descriptive 
trademark, such a nonfunctional product configuration would be 
protectable only if the source-designating function of the 
configuration is factually demonstrated with proof of secondary 
meaning.  So if the consumer is likely to be motivated, in some 
more than incidental part, to buy a product because of a 
particular combination or arrangement of features, other than 
because that configuration signifies a source of the product, the 
penumbra of the patent laws -- granting others a right to copy 
what has been donated to the public domain -- will deny 
protection unless secondary meaning is first shown. 
 The primarily source-designating inquiry is different 
from the functionality inquiry in trade dress law, although it is 
(..continued) 
rules governing the grant of a patent by injudiciously affording 
similar protections without even a showing of secondary meaning.  
Cf. Keene Corp., 653 F.2d at 824, 827-28 (affirming an injunction 
requiring only labeling, but not precluding copying, of a 
functional design with secondary meaning -- relying on discussion 
of the patent laws in Sears, Roebuck, 376 U.S. at 231-32, 84 
S. Ct. at 788-89); American Greetings Corp., 807 F.2d at 1147 
(holding that an injunction must be "sufficiently narrow to avoid 
affording underserved patent protection") (quoting Ideal Toy 
Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78, 84 (3d Cir. 1982)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
 
motivated by similar concerns.  Both are intended to protect 
competition -- and hence consumers -- by restricting the types of 
product features that may be insulated from copying.  
Nevertheless, the primarily source-designating inquiry is 
different from the functionality inquiry, for it limits 
inherently distinctive product configurations not to those that 
are not important for competitors to be able to copy, but rather 
to those whose primary significance is as an intrinsic indicator 
of the product's source. 
 We acknowledge that, to a large extent, how courts 
resolve the inherent distinctiveness inquiry could, theoretically 
at least, cause a snowballing effect.  If product configurations 
are easily protected, consumers might learn to rely on 
configurations as source designators; if protection is rare, 
consumers will disregard product configurations as source 
designators, and no confusion will result.  But partial 
protection, if not carefully circumscribed, may eventually cause 
even greater consumer confusion, as consumers will face 
difficulties determining what features are legitimate source 
designators (because inherently distinctive) and which are not.  
The narrow test that we adopt encourages consumers to rely on a 
product's configuration as a source designator only when it 
rather plainly serves an identifying function. 
 We believe that the aforementioned requirements for 
inherent distinctiveness, while nascent and in need of caselaw 
development, allow a source genuinely intent upon using a 
particular feature or configuration of its product to signify 
 
 
itself as the source to do so -- at no meaningful cost to free 
competition -- without having to prove consumer association 
(secondary meaning).  We turn to the application of this standard 
to the facts of this case. 
 
III.  THE LAW APPLIED 
 Because the district court applied the Abercrombie & 
Fitch trademark taxonomy (generic, descriptive, suggestive, 
arbitrary, or fanciful) instead of the above standard, see mem. 
op. at 12-14, we cannot let its finding of non-distinctiveness 
stand.  While this would normally result in a remand, we need not 
remand if, with the evidence viewed in the light most favorable 
to it, Duraco has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success 
on the merits.  See In re Molded Acoustical Prods., Inc. (Fiber 
Lite Corp. v. Molded Acoustical Prods., Inc.), 18 F.3d 217, 222 & 
n.7 (3d Cir. 1994).  We conclude that this is the case, for 
Duraco's Grecian Classics planters plainly are not inherently 
distinctive, and it has not shown the acquired distinctiveness 
(secondary meaning) that it would otherwise need to establish in 
order for its product configuration to be protectable. 
 
 A. Inherent Distinctiveness 
 We do not gainsay that the particular configuration of 
Duraco's urn may be memorable and unusual.  In this regard, we 
disagree with the district court's conclusion that "all of the 
urns introduced as exhibits . . . looked about the same, as did 
those presented in drawings," mem. op. at 10.  Instead, after 
 
 
viewing most of the plastic planter designs introduced in the 
district court, including the physical exhibits and drawings, we 
believe that some definitely have a look that consumers could not 
reasonably confuse with the Grecian Classics, Backyard Products, 
or Cotswold planters.  While mere distinguishability without more 
is, as we have explained, insufficient to establish that a 
product configuration is memorable and unusual in the sense that 
it could be an inherently distinctive indicium of source, we 
cannot say with certainty that Duraco's planters were not 
memorable and unusual at the time that Joy introduced the 
Ultimate Urns into interstate commerce. 
 Our review of course is deferential.  But we need not run 
out the string in our review of the district court's fact finding 
in this respect for, at all events, we are satisfied that the 
Grecian Classics' design rather clearly falls outside the 
inherently distinctive category. 
 First, it is beyond peradventure that Duraco's alleged 
protectable product configuration is not conceptually separable 
from its plastic planters.  Unlike an arbitrary carving etched 
into the back of a chair to identify the source, for example, the 
features of the Grecian Classics for which Duraco seeks 
protection are designed to achieve the goal of having the planter 
appear as if constructed of marble or stone, and thus constitute 
part and parcel of the overall product.13 
                     
   13.   It is apparent at this point that the definition of the 
product market will have an important bearing on whether a 
feature or combination or arrangement of features is conceptually 
separable from the product.  Here the district court impliedly 
 
 
 Second, consumers are likely to appreciate the Grecian 
Classics' design, as the district court found to be the case, 
primarily as an inherently attractive aspect of the product, not 
as a source-indicator.  Abundant and uncontroverted testimony 
established that Duraco adopted its features to create the 
appearance of a marble, stone, or cement Grecian or classical-
style urn, not to identify itself as the source.  Indeed, Duraco 
itself admits that consumers are largely motivated to purchase 
Grecian Classics because of the aesthetic advantages of the 
precise configuration for which it seeks protection.  Moreover, 
Joy imitated the Grecian Classics' design because of its 
aesthetic appeal to consumers. 
 In sum, two of the requirements for inherent 
distinctiveness not having been satisfied, we easily conclude 
that Duraco's planter is not inherently distinctive. 
 
 B. Acquired Distinctiveness (Secondary Meaning) 
 The absence of inherent distinctiveness means that to 
establish a likelihood of success on the merits of its trade 
dress infringement claim, Duraco must prove secondary meaning, 
which the district court found it had not done.  See mem. op. at 
14-16.  Although the point is without difficulty, we will briefly 
review it for clear error. 
(..continued) 
found that the appropriate product category was plastic 
"classically styled urns" for plants, see mem. op. at 17, and, no 
party having challenged that finding, we are not called upon to 




 If a product's configuration is not inherently 
distinctive, the plaintiff must prove acquired distinctiveness 
via a showing of secondary meaning.  Factors relevant to a 
finding of secondary meaning in a product configuration include:  
(1) plaintiff's advertising expenditures, measured primarily with 
regard to those advertisements which highlight the supposedly 
distinctive, identifying feature, see First Brands Corp. v. Fred 
Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1383 (9th Cir. 1987); (2) consumer 
surveys linking the distinctive product configuration to a 
particular, single source (although the identity of the source 
need not be known); and (3) length and exclusivity of use.  
Consumer surveys and testimony are probably the only direct 
evidence of secondary meaning; the other sources are 
circumstantial, though the plaintiff may rely solely on them.  
See Aromatique, 28 F.3d at 871 (per curiam) (plurality opinion by 
Morris Sheppard Arnold, J.) (secondary meaning for trade dress); 
Woodsmith Publishing Co., 904 F.2d at 1249 (same); International 
Kennel Club, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1086 (7th 
Cir. 1988) (secondary meaning for trademark). 
 Sales success by itself will typically not be as 
probative of secondary meaning in a product configuration case as 
in a trademark case, since the product's market success may well 
be attributable to the desirability of the product configuration 
rather than the source-designating capacity of the supposedly 
distinguishing feature or combination of features.  And unlike 
with a trademark, where repeated purchases of a product support 
an inference that consumers have associated the mark with the 
 
 
producer or source, one can much less confidently presume that a 
consumer's repeated purchase of a product has created an 
association between a particular product configuration and the 
source.  Cf. International Jensen, 4 F.2d at 824 (product 
configuration) ("While evidence of a manufacturer's sales, 
advertising and promotional activities may be relevant in 
determining secondary meaning, the true test of secondary meaning 
is the effectiveness of this effort to create it."); Braun, Inc., 
975 F.2d at 826-27 (product configuration) (same); First Brands 
Corp., 809 F.2d at 1383 (product packaging) (same); American 
Footwear Corp. v. General Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655, 663 (2d 
Cir. 1979) (trademark) (same). 
 The very fact that a consumer could identify the source 
based on the product's configuration implies that the 
configuration is at least somewhat unusual, and this 
"distinctiveness" of the product itself may be the source of the 
motivation to purchase if a consumer does not care about who the 
source is.  In this respect product configuration again differs 
dramatically from trademark and from product packaging, since the 
success of a particular product -- especially if similar 
competing products exist -- does not readily lead to the 
inference of source identification and consumer interest in the 
source; it may well be that the product, inclusive of the product 
configuration, is itself inherently desirable, in a way that 
product packagings and trademarks are not.  Similarly, 
unsolicited media coverage may reflect interest more in an 
unusual product than in the source of the product. 
 
 
 Analogously, attempts to copy a product configuration 
will quite often not be probative:  the copier may very well be 
exploiting a particularly desirable feature, rather than seeking 
to confuse consumers as to the source of the product.  See 
Aromatique, 28 F.3d at 871 (per curiam) (plurality opinion by 
Morris Sheppard Arnold, J.); Braun, Inc., 975 F.2d at 827; supra 
at typescript Error! Bookmark not defined.-34; cf. Brown, Design 
Protection: An Overview, 34 U.C.C.A. L. REV. at 1384-85 
(observing that the act of copying a product configuration does 
not ipso facto involve false representation).  The inference of 
unfair competition will be even weaker where the copier takes 
conspicuous steps -- whether in packaging, trademark, marketing 
techniques, or otherwise -- to distinguish its product from its 
competitor's. 
 In sum, secondary meaning in a product configuration case 
will generally not be easy to establish.  We note, however, that 
in certain circumstances, e.g., with respect to drugs or pills 
with unusual colors and/or shapes, a consumer may be more likely 
to rely on the product's configuration as a source designator, 
and the consumer may thereby have become sensitized, so that 
secondary meaning will be easier to establish.  This may be the 
case if the good is one with some features of importance to a 
consumer's choice that a consumer ordinarily cannot recognize in 
the market (such as the safety and efficacy of a drug) and one in 
which, because of the nature of the product's use or consumption, 
identifying source designations might not readily be prominently 
displayed.  Cf. Sinko, 105 F.2d at 453 (stating that with 
 
 
products like drugs, where the efficiency of the product depends 
greatly upon the maker's capacity, consumers would care more 
about the pills' manufacturer than the appearance of the drug 
itself). 
 With respect to Duraco's Grecian Classics, we fully 
concur in the district court's finding of no secondary meaning.  
Duraco in its survey has not shown any consumer association 
between the Grecian Classics planters and a particular source; 
instead, its plastic planters are purchased because consumers 
(whether retail or wholesale) find them innately desirable, 
probably because of their pleasing "attic shape."14  Moreover, 
the evidence indicates without contradiction that Joy emulated 
Duraco's design because Joy believed it to be a superior one, not 
to trade on Duraco's non-existent good will in the Grecian 
Classics' configuration. 
 In addition, Duraco has not emphasized its alleged trade 
dress in its advertising, relying instead primarily on small 
depictions of the entire product.  Finally, Duraco exclusively 
sold planters with the "Grecian Classics look" for at most five 
years, not so long a time as to raise a strong inference of 
consumer association with a single source.  Therefore, because 
                     
   14.    
 O Attic shape!  Fair attitude! with brede 
   Of marble men and maidens overwrought, 
 With forest branches and the trodden weed; 
   Thou, silent form! dost tease us out of thought 
 As doth eternity:  Cold Pastoral! 
 
John Keats, Ode on a Grecian Urn (excerpt from last stanza).  
 
 
the district court was correct and a fortiori not clearly 
erroneous, we will affirm its finding of no secondary meaning. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 Applying the standard that this opinion has articulated 
for determining whether product configurations are inherently 
distinctive, we have concluded, viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to Duraco, that Duraco's Grecian Classics plastic 
planters are not inherently distinctive.  We have further 
concluded that the district court was not clearly erroneous in 
finding that Duraco has failed to show secondary meaning.  Thus, 
having demonstrated neither inherent nor acquired 
distinctiveness, Duraco has not established a likelihood of 
success on the merits of its Lanham Act action for trade dress 
infringement.  For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the 
district court's order denying Duraco's motion for a preliminary 
injunction.  The district court's further proceedings resolving 
the case on final hearing will, of course, be conducted 
consistently with this opinion. 
